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When the Law is more than the law. 
 
Cian Murphy and Penny Green‘s collected volume Law and Outsiders: Norms, Processes and 
‘Othering’ in the 21
st
 Century is drawn from papers presented at the 2008 International Graduate Legal 
Research Conference.  They state in their preface that the essays represent some of the best doctoral 
level scholarship conducted in law schools today, and this may be true in more ways than one.  For 
while the book‘s title suggests an exploration of norms and the processes of demarcating and even 
creating the ‗other‘, many of the early essays in the volume are far too deferential to the law to see 
how the law itself is an instrument not only of governmentality, but also in separating bodies to be 
ruled differentially, distinctively, and decisively.  However, the second half of the volume begins to 
bring more focus to the problems of differentiation and distinction. 
 
In his chapter on judicial review, Nelson Dordelly-Rosales quotes U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antony 
Scalia decrying a notion of a ‗living-tree‘ of judicial interpretation, suggesting that such dynamic social 
engagements actually lead to anti-democratic outcomes.  Scalia states simply ―[w]hat democracy 
means is that the majority rules…If you do not believe that, you do not believe in democracy‖ (p. 45). 
Yet, just who constitutes a majority is not so obvious.  Moreover, the very law which is to defend 
Scalia‘s democracy can be used to distinguish who is recognised within a polity and who is not; who is 
counted and who is ignored; and who is afforded rights and who is denied.  These issues are taken up 
most directly in the chapters contributed by Egle Dagilyte and Diego Acosta.  In each they examine 
social rights, residence, and representation in the European Union.  Acosta examines the mechanisms 
that afford certain protection to Third Country Nationals in the EU, namely protections for the freedom 
of movement and against expulsions for Turkish nationals who have lived in Germany and elsewhere 
for long periods of time; Stephen Coutts adds a third chapter on migration with an examination of the 
Akrich ruling on lawful residence.  In all three the issue of movement and residency is a contested 
mode of distinction.  Some bodies move freely through the space of the EU and can settle where they 
choose; other bodies are subject to regulations depending on from whence they came; and still others 
yet are subject to further scrutiny depending on their interactions with regulatory bodies during their 
stay in the EU.  Even though many of the cases cited move through the European Court of Human 
Rights, it becomes clear that these rights are not borne by the individual, but are conferred by the 
state, even when the ECHR finds that a right may be a human right.  Marton Varju‘s analysis on this 
very question of the interface between ECHR rulings on broad interpretations of human rights and 
specific EU laws is particularly engaging and insightful. 
 
This debate is also at the heart of Vincent Depaigne‘s chapter visiting Jürgen Habermas‘ (1996) notion 
that the tension between the universal and the particular is the ―Janus face of the modern nation-state‖ 
(Depaigne, 2011: 251). Recasting the opposing views of Rene Rousseau and Edmund Burke 
regarding the source of rights – from the sovereignty of the individual or from the sovereignty of the 
state – Depaigne offers three ‗models‘ for approaching this tension between the universal and the 
particular.  In each he recognises the role of the state in determining the status and protections for 
minority groups.  As such the distinction between each model is a political one.  The politics of law is 
also particularly acute in Dorota Gozdecka‘s analysis of Blasphemy laws in the EU.  In both chapters 
the engagements of the community, its standards and its tastes, are seen as political contests.  These 
contests are clashes of norms and are settled through not only juridical judgment but also community 
opinion. 
 
This is the focus of the concluding chapter by Craig Reeves.  Comparing Hannah Arendt and 
Theodore Adorno‘s perspectives on judging and judgment, Reeves finds the distinction between them 
as their different visions of community.  Reeves suggests that Arendt‘s community is ―flat and 
undifferentiated‖, while Adorno‘s conception of community is dynamically structured through material 
practice (p. 289), particularly those that create solidarity of humanity, transcending individual interests 
(p. 288). By taking up Adorno‘s notions – confronting the absence of freedom for others, fighting 
against suffering, and building what Adorno called a ―solidarity with tormented bodies‖ – Reeves 
suggests that it is identification with those who are excluded that will build a critical engagement with 
the world. It is also this solidarity of suffering that results in the recognition of rape and sexual assault 
as war crimes, as described in Benedetta Faedi Duramy‘s contribution.  For it is not enactments of 
such abominations on women during war that is new, but rather it is the recognition that such violence 
is an offense to all of humanity that is new.  It is the recognition of the suffering of women and a new 
global solidarity among and with women that contributes to a greater sense of universal justice.  
Moreover this attention to the suffering of others is a far different view of human solidarity and 
democracy than Scalia‘s simple interpretation of the importance of majority rule. 
 
Unfortunately the collection lacks a clear articulation by the editors of their vision for the book and their 
reasoning for the organization of the essays. Introductory and concluding chapters by Murphy and 
Green would have provided a frame for reading all of the contributions.  Also a number of the early 
essays are very technical and do not address the processes of ‗othering‘ mentioned in the subtitle.  
Nevertheless explorations such as this, in the use of law as an instrument of governmentality to 
separate bodies, are important engagements not only for law students but also for all students and 
scholars of social research and politics.  Likewise, it is encouraging to see the law as a subject of 
critical inquiry from law students, for in the end the applications of the law and the constructions of 
juridical orders are enactments of power. 
 
Bibliography 
Habermas, J., 1996, ‗The European nation-state—its achievements and its limits: on the past and 
future of sovereignty and citizenship‘, in: G. Balakrishnan (Ed.), Mapping the Nation, London: Verso. 
